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Most independent nations today were part of empires in 1945. Using bilateral trade data from 1948 to 2006,
we examine the effect of independence on post-colonial trade. While there is little short-run effect on trade,
after four decades trade with the metropole (colonizer) has contracted by about 65%. Hostile separations
lead to large, immediate reductions in trade. We also ﬁnd that trade between former colonies of the same
empire erodes as much as trade with the metropole, whereas trade with third countries decreases about 20%.
The gradual trade deterioration following independence suggests the depreciation of some form of trading
capital.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The dismantling of European empires after World War II led to
sweeping changes in thegovernanceof developing countries inAfrica and
Asia. Recent research in economics has investigated the long-run conse-
quences of colonial rule. La Porta et al. (1998) argue that the British
endowed their colonies with a legal system that produces superior eco-
nomic outcomes. Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) ﬁnd that colonizers were
more likely to establish pro-growth institutions in sparsely populated
areas with lower settler mortality. Banerjee and Iyer (2005) ﬁnd that
50 years after India abolished land revenue systems that the British
imposed in themid-19th century, their“institutional overhang”manifests
itself in agricultural productivity differences. Huillery (2009) shows that
uneven colonial investment partly explains current income inequalities
within former FrenchWest Africa. In this paper,we investigate a different
legacy of colonial rule: the bias in post-colonial bilateral trade patterns.
Algeria's trade with France offers prima facie evidence of large post-
colonial trade erosion. In 1962, the year of independence, Algeria
accounted for 8.8% of French imports, a share that had been stable over
the preceding 14-year period. The share fell by two thirds over the next
twodecades (to2.7% in1984) andanother two thirdsover the succeeding
twodecades, reaching1.0% in2006. Avariety of potential explanations for
this fact suggest themselves. First, it might reﬂect poor economic
performance over the last four decades by Algeria, which may have
reduced its exports to all markets. Second, Algeria's abandonment of the
Franc in 1964may have raised currency transaction costs. Third, France's
participation in GATT and the European Community probably redirected
its import purchasing patterns, lowering the share taken by any absolute
level of imports from Algeria. Fourth, deterioration of business networks
and trade-creating institutions may have raised bilateral trade costs.
Utilizing data encompassing almost every country in the world
from 1948 and 2006, we identify the impact of independence based
on within variation in bilateral trade. In a non-parametric speciﬁca-
tion, we estimate the effect of years since independence. Unlike the
work cited in the opening paragraph, we will take as given any
changes in per capita incomes caused by changing internal institu-
tions. We also control for formal external institutions (membership in
regional trade agreements, GATT, and currency unions). This allows us
to focus on the effects of unobserved informal external institutions as
well as the business networks emphasized by Rauch (1999).
Countries in colonial empires choose if andwhen to separate, raising
the concern of endogeneity bias. As we discuss in Section 2, historical
accounts suggest a signiﬁcant random component to independence
events. Nevertheless, systematic determinants of independence are a
possible source of bias. The political and economic attributes of the
colonizer (metropole) and colony, as well as the strength of their
bilateral association, may affect the likelihood of independence. We
remove these factors, however, in speciﬁcations that eliminate time-
varying country effects and non-time varying bilateral effects.
We ﬁnd that four decades after independence, trade between
colony and metropole had fallen by about 65%. Our results are
supported by a falsiﬁcation exercise where we randomly create false
colonial links (with random dates of independence) and ﬁnd no
evidence of independence effects for the countries in these false
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colonial relationships. We categorize independence events into
amicable and hostile separations, and ﬁnd that, while the latter are
more immediately destructive to trade, both generate similar levels of
trade erosion in the long-run.
We also investigate potential trade redirection by examining the
effects of independence on trade with siblings (other colonies in the
same empire) and tradewith rest-of-world (ROW). Trade erosionwith
siblings is comparable to that of trade with metropoles. Trade also
decreases with ROW. Finally, we examine the impact of independence
on the extensive margin of trade. We ﬁnd that independence has a
strong, but gradual, negative inﬂuence on the probability of positive
tradeﬂows between the colony andmetropole. However,we see small
positive increases in the propensity to trade with siblings and ROW.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe our
panel of independence events and bilateral trade data. Section 3
speciﬁes a gravity model employing country-pair (dyad) ﬁxed effects.
Due to the computational difﬁculties of estimating country-year ﬁxed
effects to capture multilateral resistance terms, we eliminate them by
implementing a method of “tetrads” that takes the ratio of ratios of
trade ﬂows. Estimates of the impact of independence on bilateral
trade are presented in Section 4. The concluding section summarizes
and interprets our results.
2. Data on independence and trade
The principal variable of interest is the timing of independence
events. We deﬁne independence as arising at the end of a colonial
period involving long-term, civilian administration that usually
includes signiﬁcant settlement. The end of a military occupation is
not a sufﬁcient condition for an independence event. Information on
colonial relationships comes from a variety of sources but we used the
CIA World Factbook as the primary authority for independence dates.
There are 255 country pairs with colonial histories, of which 34
remain current. Fig. 1 displays the number of countries that gained
independence since 1900, a total of 174.1 The twomain colonizers in this
sample, the UK and France, are shown in dark and light gray,
respectively, with all others grouped and represented as black bars.
The two highest black spikes correspond to the possessions lost by the
defeated nations after World War I and the dissolution of the Soviet
Union in 1991.
The timing of the independences shown in Fig. 1 reﬂects a variety
of political and economic forces. Historical accounts point to an
important role for idiosyncratic events. For example, France's
President De Gaulle ﬁrst threatened to cut ties (and aid) to African
colonies that voted to leave the “French Community.” However, after
Guinea declared sovereignty in 1958, De Gaulle reversed position and
offered economic cooperation agreements to all countries that voted
for independence. Fourteen colonies promptly gained independence
in 1960. Rothermund (2006, p. 153) remarks that “in 1960 the French
almost had to impose independence on a reluctant Gabon” because De
Gaulle “did not tolerate exceptions to the granting of independence in
1960.” This was despite oil and uranium resources that “the French
were interested in keeping under their control.” In contrast to the
wave of independence for French colonies in the 1960s, Portugal
adamantly clung to its ﬁve “overseas provinces” in Africa until after
the Salazar dictatorship was replaced with a democratic and pro-
decolonization government in 1974.
To estimate the inﬂuence of the independence events on bilateral
trade, we use the International Monetary Fund's Direction of Trade
Statistics (DOTS). It covers the 1948–2006 period, which is of crucial
importance, since this includes pre-independence trade for many
countries, as well as the immediate years following independence.
While DOTS lacks data on trade for individual goods, it is the only data
set containing a panel of worldwide bilateral trade that goes back far
enough to study the main independence events of the twentieth
century. Our typical regression includes around 600,000 observations.
3. Speciﬁcation
In order to estimate the effects of independence, we need a
benchmark for the amount of trade expected had independence not
occurred.Wewill follow the common practice ofmodeling “expected”
bilateral trade using a speciﬁcation based on the gravity equation.
All the well-known empirical and theoretical formulations of the
gravity equation can be represented in the following equation for the
value of xijt, the exports from exporting country i to importing country
j in year t:2
xijt = GtM
ex
it M
im
jt ϕijt : ð1Þ
In this equation, Mitex and Mjtim are indexes of the attributes of
exporter i and importer j in a speciﬁc year, and Gt is a common year-
speciﬁc factor determining trade. Variation in bilateral trade intensity
enters through ϕijt. We refer to Mitex and Mjtim as monadic effects and
ϕijt as the dyadic effect. Following Eaton and Kortum (2002), we
approximate the log of the dyadic term ϕijt as a linear combination of
factors that affect trade costs between i and j:
lnϕijt = δDijt + uijt : ð2Þ
The Dijt and uijt in this equation represent respectively observed
and unobserved bilateral trade cost determinants.
The conventional approach to estimation is to take logs of Eq. (1)
and substitute in Eq. (2) to obtain
ln xijt = lnGt + lnM
ex
it + lnM
im
jt + δDijt + uijt : ð3Þ
Alternatively, we can re-express Eq. (3) as
xijt = exp ln Gt + lnM
ex
it + lnM
im
jt + δDijt
! "
ηijt ; ð4Þ
where ηijt≡exp(uijt). Under the assumption that the expectation of η
conditional on the covariates equals one, the parameters can be
Fig. 1. Independence events since 1900.
1 Table A.4 in the Appendix lists independence events since 1900 as well as the
continuing colonial relationships for which we have trade data.
2 See Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Eaton and Kortum (2002), and Chaney
(2008) for three theoretical foundations of the gravity equation relying on very
different modeling assumptions.
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estimated consistently using Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood
estimation (PMLE).3
We use year dummies to capture ln Gt. The next two subsections
explain how we model the monadic (ln Mitex and ln Mjtim) and dyadic
(Dijt and uijt) effects.
3.1. Monadic issues
In many empirical applications the exporter and importer
attributes are assumed to be determined by GDP and GDP per capita.
We prefer to separate size and development effects and therefore
express the monadic terms as Mitex=Nitα1yitα2 and Mjtim=Njtα3yjtα4, where
N represents population and y is GDP per capita.4 Plugging in these
monadic effects, we re-express Eq. (3) as
ln xijt = lnGt + α1lnNit + α2ln yit + α3lnNjt + α4ln yjt + δDijt + uijt :
ð5Þ
Variants onEq. (5) are referred to as gravity equations andhave been
used in hundreds of papers to estimate the determinants of bilateral
trade patterns. They suffer from a serious ﬂaw that has become well-
known due to thework of Anderson and vanWincoop (2003). Standard
gravity equations omit “multilateral resistance” terms that are functions
of the whole set ofϕijt. Feenstra (2004, pp. 153–163) discusses different
approaches to estimating gravity equations that take into account
multilateral resistance. The preferred method for most applications
(such as papers like ours that focus on estimating parts ofDijt) usesﬁxed
effects for each exporter-year and importer-year to “absorb” the
monadic effects (ln Mitex and ln Mjtim) in Eq. (3). With a balanced panel
of bilateral exports, awithin transformation could beused to remove the
two sets of monadic effects. Due to missing data, zeros, and variation in
the number of partners for each reporting country, actual bilateral data
sets are almost never balanced. Baltagi (1995, p. 160) points out that the
within transformation does not workwith unbalanced two-way panels.
One should therefore use the least squares dummy variable (LSDV)
method. Since DOTS has close to 200 trade entities and over 50 years of
trade, the LSDV approach would involve about 20,000 dummies.
Estimation requires a massive matrix inversion that is beyond the
capability of commonly used statistical software.
We apply a different approach to estimation. It takes advantage of
themultiplicative structure of Eq. (1) and then takes the ratio of ratios
to eliminate the monadic effects (including the multilateral resistance
terms). This requires a set of four trading partners. For that reason, we
call it the method of tetrads.
Consider four countries indexed i, j, k, and ‘. Using Eq. (1), the
ratio of i's exports to j over its exports to importer k is given by
Rifjkgt =
xijt
xikt
=
Mimjt ϕijt
Mimkt ϕikt
: ð6Þ
We have canceled out Gt, and more importantly,Mitex, the exporter
ﬁxed effect. The Mjtim/Mktim ratio remains problematic for estimation
however, and we now need an expression parallel to Eq. (6)
containing Mjtim/Mktim that we can divide Ri{jk}t by in order to cancel
out these remaining monadic terms. This can be achieved by picking a
reference exporter ‘ and calculating the corresponding ratio to the
same pair of importers:
R‘fjkgt =
x‘jt
x‘kt
=
Mimjt ϕ‘jt
Mimkt ϕ‘kt
: ð7Þ
Taking the ratio of ratios we can deﬁne the tetradic term
rfi‘gfjkgt≡
Rifjkgt
R‘fjkgt
=
xijt = xikt
x‘jt = x‘kt
=
ϕijt =ϕikt
ϕ‘jt =ϕ‘kt
; ð8Þ
where the tetrad comprises two exporters, {i‘}, and two importers,
{jk}. Taking logs, we have
ln rfi‘gfjkgt = lnϕijt−lnϕikt−lnϕ‘jt + lnϕ‘kt : ð9Þ
Plugging Eq. (2) into the four ln ϕ in Eq. (9), we obtain a second
estimating equation:
ln rfi‘gfjkgt = δD˜ijt + u˜ijt ; ð10Þ
where D˜ijt≡Dijt−Dikt−D‘ jt+D‘kt and ũijt≡uijt−μikt−u‘ jt+u‘kt. Each
variable in D˜ijt can take ﬁve possible values: 2, 1, 0, −1 and −2,
depending on the pattern of linkages within the tetrad.5
The tetrad approach can be seen as an extension of existing ratio
approaches that take advantage of the multiplicative functional form
of the gravity equation to eliminate either the exporters' (Anderson
and Marcouiller, 2002) or importers' (Head and Mayer, 2000; Martin
et al., 2008) ﬁxed effects. Combining the two approaches yields a
speciﬁcation free of any monadic term.6 Two recent papers also employ
the ratio of ratios to eliminate the monadic terms. Romalis (2007)
estimates the response of US imports from Canada and Mexico to
NAFTA tariff reductions. Hallak (2006) uses the approach to quantify
the economic magnitude of coefﬁcients obtained from ﬁxed effects
gravity equations.
The tetrad method presents two special issues. First, one needs to
select the reference countries k and ‘ in order to do the tetrad
calculations. In their single-ratio methods, Anderson and Marcouiller
(2002) andMartin et al. (2008) take the United States as the reference
country. The EU is the reference importer and the rest of the world is
the reference exporter in Romalis (2007). Generating all possible
tetrad combinations is infeasible since it would involve dealing with
billions of observations in our case. Instead, we estimate results using
the six countries with the most extensive trade partner coverage as
our reference countries. While we ﬁnd that the choice of reference
countries has some effect on results, the basic shape andmagnitude of
independence effects are robust.
A second issue with tetrads concerns the independence of the
observations. As represented in Eq. (10), the error terms μ‘kt, μikt, and
μ‘jt, appear repeatedly across observations. Indeed, μ‘kt is contained in
each observation for year t. Year dummies can account for μ‘kt but
correlated errors remain as a consequence of μikt, and μ‘jt. The
appropriate form of clustering is more complex than usual here, since
the repeated presences of μikt and μ‘jt call for both exporter-year and
importer-year clusters, which are non-nested. We therefore use
three-way clustering—it, jt, and ij—employing the method of Cameron
et al. (forthcoming).7
3.2. Dyadic issues
We divide the set of dyadic variables, Dijt, into two groups: a set of
control variables typically used in gravity regressions and a set of
indicators that represent current and past colonial ties. Some of the
dyadic controls are time-invariant and therefore drop out in
speciﬁcations based on within-dyad variation. The time-invariant
3 See Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) for full development of the rationale for
Poisson PMLE.
4 Using GDP instead of population results in different coefﬁcient estimates for ln y
but an otherwise identical ﬁt.
5 For example the tetrad-transformed indicator variable would equal 2 if a link
exists between i and j as well as between k and ℓ but not between i and k nor between
j and ℓ.
6 The computational beneﬁts of the tetrads approach would be even greater for
commodity level trade since monadic terms are presumed to be good-speciﬁc.
7 Stata code for tetrad estimation and a link to the multi-way clustering code are
available at http://strategy.sauder.ubc.ca/head/sup/.
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controls are distance, shared border, shared language, and shared
legal origins. The time-varying controls include belonging to a
common regional trade arrangement (RTA), belonging jointly to
GATT/WTO, and sharing a currency. To capture preferential tariffs
conferred to former colonies by European metropoles, we add an
indicator for Asia–Caribbean–Paciﬁc (ACP) treatment of imports into
the European Union (or preceding associations). The time-varying list
of ACP countries is provided in Appendix A.
The colonial linkage variables identify the effects of being in a current
or former colonial relationship.We use a comprehensive set of indicators
to capture the presence and type of colonial relationship between two
trading partners. The variable ColHistij indicates that country i and jwere
once, or are still, in a colonial relationship. ColAlwaysij turns on for trade
between the countries in ongoing colonial relationships and their
metropole.8 Our focus is on colony–metropole trade in the years
subsequent to independence. To avoid imposing any functional form
on the evolution of bilateral trade following independence, we estimate
the independence effects with indicator variables that turn on for each
number of years since independence, up to a capwhichwe set at 60. The
independence dummies (Indep1ijt to Indep60ijt) indicate trade between
countries with independence events in all years other than the year of
independence and years preceding independence.9 Thus, trade between
a colony and its metropole up to and including the independence year is
reﬂected by the coefﬁcient on the ColHist variable.
The vector of dyadic variables, while containing all the “usual
suspects,” remains incomplete. Unobserved dyadic linkages end up in
the error term (uijt). The concern is that there may be unobserved
bilateral inﬂuences on both trade and the decision to become
independent. We employ two econometric techniques to deal with this
potential source of bias. First, we introduce a lagged dependent variable
to control for unobserved inﬂuences on trade that evolve gradually over
time. Unfortunately, estimates are not consistent if there is a ﬁxed
component ofuijt that is correlatedwith the control variables. The second
method controls for unobserved, but ﬁxed, component of bilateral
linkages using dyadic ﬁxed effects. This speciﬁcation identiﬁes the effect
of independence based on temporal (within-dyad) variation.10
3.3. Treatment of “zero” and “small” observations
DOTS data include reports of trade from both the exporter and
importer and we explain how we utilize both sources of information
in Appendix A. Appendix A also details important data inaccuracies—
incorrect zeros and implausibly small values of trade—that inﬂuence
the regression method employed.
In the data set generated from the DOTS CD, 1% of the positive trade
observations are valued at less than $500 and there are 42 cases of trade
of onecent. Thesenumbers seem implausibly lowandhave thepotential
to distort results when taking logs.11 The IMF documentation states that
trade is recorded in millions with accuracy out to one or two decimal
places, depending on the reporting country. Two decimal places would
make the smallest value of trade $10,000. Accordingly, we round the
data to the nearest $0.01 million; trade below 0.005 becomes zero.
After rounding, the data set has 1,204,671 total observations of
which 529,663 correspond to zero trade.12 A linear-in-logs speciﬁcation
converts the zeros to missing and these observations drop out of the
sample, potentially introducing selection bias. The Poisson PMLE is an
appealing alternative because it incorporates the zeros and delivers
consistent estimates as long as ηijt in Eq. (4) has an expectation of one
conditional on the covariates.13Monte Carlo results ofMartin and Pham
(2009), however, show that Poisson PMLE yields “severely biased
estimates” when large numbers of zeros are generated by a limited-
dependent variable process. The natural method to handle data
generated by a limited-dependent variable process is Tobit. While, like
Poisson PMLE, Tobit incorporates the zeros, it makes strong parametric
assumptions on the error term: log normality and homoskedasticity.
Techniques that incorporate zeros may generate biased estimates if
some trade ﬂows are incorrectly reported as zeros. As we discuss in
Appendix A, there are instances of reported zeros in colony–metropole
trade before or just after the year of independence that should be coded
as missing. For example, French exports to Vietnam are erroneously
recorded as zero between 1948 and 1954. In DOTS they appear to jump
from zero to $132.9 million in 1955 (1954 is the year of independence).
Russian exports to Ukraine jump from 0 to $6 billion from1993 to 1994.
Such incorrect zero trade observations can lead to bias in the estimated
independence effects in either Tobit or Poisson PMLE.
Another problem for Tobit estimation iswhat to use as the left censor
value. Cameron and Trivedi (2009, p. 531) recommend using the
observed minimum value of logged exports. We do not want to use the
actual minimum value of one cent but the minimum value implied by
our rounding suggests a left censor of ln(0.005). However, it is not
certain that 0.01 million is the correct rounding point for all tradeﬂows.
Felbermayr and Kohler (2006) add one to actual trade in order to
include the zero trade observations. This method generates different
results depending on the units of actual trade (i.e., dollars or millions of
dollars). We ran Tobit regressions using four different ways of handling
zeros: coding zeros to be $5000, coding them as $500, adding one to
exports in dollars, and adding one to exports in millions of dollars. In
results available athttp://strategy.sauder.ubc.ca/head/sup/,weﬁnd that
the independence estimates are highly sensitive to the treatment of the
zeros. Depending on the speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd both Tobit and marginal
effects (Tobit estimatesmultiplied by the probability of non-zero trade)
that are smaller and larger than thoseobtained inOLS regressionswhere
the zeros are dropped. The same holds for coefﬁcients on other gravity
covariates such as GDP and distance.
In light of the problems associated with incorrect zeros and the
sensitivity of Tobit estimation to the value assigned to zero trade, we do
not use this method of estimation. Instead, we follow the conventional
method of taking the log of actual trade and dropping observations
where trade is recorded as zero. We also report estimates for Poisson
PMLE to verify that our results are robust to this speciﬁcation.
4. Results
Before presenting regression results, we begin this section by
providing evidence of large independence effects using two instruc-
tive cases. Our main econometric results are discussed in Section 4.2
where we report estimates of the control variables and independence
effects for six alternative speciﬁcations. In the following subsection,
we conduct a falsiﬁcation exercise to test whether the results are
driven by spurious dynamics. Section 4.4 categorizes independence
events as amicable or hostile and examines differences in trade
erosion between the two. We extend the analysis to investigate the
effects of independence on trade between colonies with a common
metropole and trade with the rest-of-world in the ensuing subsection.
Finally, in Section 4.6, we consider the effect of independence on the
extensive margin of trade.
8 We deﬁne ongoing as existing in 2006, the last year of our sample.
9 There are only 1474 positive trade values for colonial trade prior to independence.
10 Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and Glick and Rose (2002) ﬁnd that dyad ﬁxed effects
can lead to substantially different results for regional trade agreements and currency
unions.
11 The log of 1.0e−8 million is −18, which is more than 5 standard deviations away
from the mean of log exports.
12 The standard gravity and Poisson PMLE regressions lose 82,085 and 258,798
observations, respectively, due to missing GDP and population data. The tetrad
speciﬁcation loses 45,008 observations due to zeros in the reference country trade
ﬂows. 13 Efﬁciency requires that the variance be proportional to the conditional mean.
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4.1. Graphic examples of independence effects
Fig. 2 displays Ivorian (I) and Ghanaian (G) trade patterns with
France (F) and the United Kingdom (U). The ﬁgure reports the ratio of
the two countries' trade ﬂows to and from France divided by the
corresponding ﬂow with the UK (xIF/xIU, xFI/xUI, and xGF/xGU, xFG/xUG).
The Ivory Coast was a colony of France until 1960 and Ghana a colony
of the UK until 1957. Ghana and the Ivory Coast make a useful case
study since they are adjacent, comparable in size, and yet had
different colonizers. Differences in distances between colonies and
metropoles seem negligible. Furthermore, changes in multilateral
resistance indices should be fairly similar.14 If colonial ties did not
inﬂuence trade, we would expect that the ratio of exports to France
over exports to the UK (shown with up-pointing triangles) to be
approximately equal to the relative size of their markets. Similarly,
relative imports from the two sources (down-pointing triangles)
would be equal to their relative production. Using GDP as themeasure
of market and production size, all four trade lines would be expected
to be close to the France-to-UK GDP ratio (dashed line) if colonial
history did not matter. Instead, we see large gaps on both sides.
France's former colony Ivory Coast tradesmuchmorewith its former
metropole than France's relative size would imply. The ratio of export
ratios toGDP ratios is 79 in the year it became independent. By 2006, the
ratio had fallen to 6. Its imports also begin heavily biased towards France
(ratio of 39) and, while the import bias also declines, it persists at 12 in
2006. On the other hand, Ghanaian trade exhibits bias towards the UK.
The ratios of relative trade to relative GDP are 13.4 (exports) and 23.1
(imports) in 1957. Their decline in recent years has been remarkable
and the bias has fallen to 1.9 (exports) and 1.3 (imports) in 2006. Even
these numbers should be seen as impressive: Forty-six years after
independence Ghana still exports about 90% more to its former ruler
than a simple gravity model would predict. From our within-dyad
regression estimates in Table 2, this is larger than if Ghana and the UK
belonged to a regional trade agreement or a currency union.15
Another interesting illustration can be made using two comparable
countries, where one gained independence, while the other remained
part of the national territory of the colonial power. The two islands of
Reunion andMauritius are particularly goodexamples, featured inFig. 3,
which uses the same graphical devices as Fig. 2. The two islands are only
250 km away, andwere both under the control of France from the early
18th century until the United Kingdom took over both islands in 1810.
Byhistorical accident, theCongress of Vienna in 1815 gaveReunionback
to France, while Mauritius remained a British colony (until the peaceful
1968 independence). The difference in the trade patterns of the two
islands is quite striking. For Reunion, both relative exports and imports
seem to ﬂuctuate around an equilibrium stable level of 50, comparable
to the level of Ivory Coast at the time of independence in Fig. 2, but
around 50 times higher than the expected level. By contrast, Mauritius
has a very different trade pattern—independencemarks a sharp change
in the ratio of relative exports to France and UK. While the “metropole
premia”was close to a factor of 200 in 1968, it falls gradually over time,
so that Mauritian exports to UK and France since 2000 are roughly the
same as the GDP ratio. Figs. 2 and 3 both portray an erosion of colonial
trade subsequent to independence. We show several other versions of
theseﬁgures for different country pairs at http://strategy.sauder.ubc.ca/
head/sup/. To estimate the average effects of years since independence
on all post-colonial relationships we now turn to regressions.
4.2. Independence effects estimates
Table 2 and Fig. 4 contain estimation results. We report results for
six regressions and present estimates of the control variables in the
ﬁrst table and graphs of independence effects in a six-panel
ﬁgure. Table 1 shows the ﬁve different speciﬁcations we employ.
In the ﬁrst four speciﬁcations, monadic effects are captured in
exporter and importer population and per capita income. The ﬁrst
column presents coefﬁcients for OLS, the typical way gravity models
have been estimated while the second column contains the Poisson
PMLE results. The ensuing two columns employ alternative methods of
dealing with unobserved dyadic effects: OLS with a lagged dependent
variable and dyadic ﬁxed effects. Standard errors of estimates in each of
theﬁrst four columns are robust to heteroskedasticity and correlation of
error terms within ij pairs.
The last two columns follow Eq. (10) in using tetradic ratios of trade
ﬂow ratios to eliminate the monadic effects. This requires choosing
reference countries (designated k and ‘ in the previous section). In
column (5) we choose France as the reference importer (k) and the UK
as the reference exporter (‘). They are the two main colonizers in our
sample andhave relatively completedata. Standard errors in column(5)
are calculated using three-way clustering: it, jt, and ij. We then ﬁnd
average results of tetrad regressions run for all 30 possible combinations
of the six countries with the largest number of partners (France, UK,
Germany, USA, Italy, and Netherlands) as the reference importers and
exporters. Column (6) summarizes the results of the 30 regressions by
reporting themeanand standard deviation of each variable's coefﬁcient.
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation pools data in a simple linear regression,
allowing us to compare results for our large panel to those in the large
gravity equation literature. The results, listed in column (1), show that
increases in exporter- and importer-country per capita income and
Fig. 2. Trade of Ivory Coast and Ghana with their respective metropoles.
14 A surge in Nigerian GDP would have approximately the same effect on Ghana and
Ivory Coast, whereas a surge in German GDP would have similar effects on the UK and
France.
15 Column (4) of Table 2 implies that RTAs and currency unions increase trade by exp
(0.435)−1=54% and exp(0.416)−1=52%.
Fig. 3. Trade of Reunion and Mauritius islands with their respective metropoles.
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population promote bilateral trade with elasticities that vary between
0.768 and 1.026. Distance between partners reduces trade and the
estimated elasticity is very close to one (the typical ﬁnding). The other
dyadic control variables—shared border, shared language, shared legal
origins, RTA andGATTmembership, and currency union—increase trade
as expected and all estimates are highly statistically signiﬁcant. We also
observe that ACP customs treatment is associated with signiﬁcantly
higher trade.
Since post-independence trade between a colony and its metropole
is captured by the 60 independence dummies, ColHist reﬂects colony–
metropole trade up to and including the year of independence. Column
(1) reveals that, prior to independence, colony–metropole tradewas 7.4
(=exp(1.995)) times higher than trade between countries that are not
in colonial relationships. Trade between the countries that are in
ongoing colonial relationships and their metropole is measured by the
sum of ColAlways and ColHist. This sum equals 1.035, indicating almost
three times more trade than countries never in a colonial relationship.
Since the coefﬁcient on ColAlways is imprecisely estimated, the data do
not reject the hypothesis that countries that remained colonies have the
same tendency to trade with the metropole as the ones that ultimately
became independent.16
Results shown in column (2) are estimated using Poisson PMLE to
incorporate observations with zero trade. Coefﬁcients on the monadic
and time-ﬁxed dyadic variables are similar to the OLS estimates,
generally having the same signs and levels of signiﬁcance. The distance
and ColHist coefﬁcients fall by one-third. Exponentiating the estimate
16 While there were 33 current colonies in 2006, DOTS only provides trade data for
16 of them.
Fig. 4. Non-parametric independence effects.
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for ColHist, 1.317, implies that a colonial relationshipmagniﬁes trade by
a factor of 3.73. In Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), Poisson PMLE
estimates on distance and colonial history (column 6 of their Table 3)
also fall relative to the OLS estimates (column 1). In common with our
results, thedistance coefﬁcientdeclines byone-third. Their estimates for
colonial history plunge from 0.397 (OLS) to 0.024 (Poisson PMLE), with
the latter insigniﬁcantlydifferent fromzero. Turning to the time-varying
dyadic variables, weﬁnd that they generally become insigniﬁcant in our
Poisson PMLE speciﬁcation. The exception being ACP that switches
signs, becomes negative, and is signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
We introduce a lagged dependent variable to the OLS speciﬁcation
and report results in column (3). The rationale for including a lagged
term is that trade patterns tend to show persistence over time and
shocks (like independence) take time to become fully reﬂected in
trade ﬂows. Furthermore, the lagged dependent variable can be seen
as a control for slow-moving unobserved inﬂuences on trade. A
drawback of this speciﬁcation is that we lose early observations that
often coincide with the year of independence. The lagged dependent
variable enters with a coefﬁcient of ρ̂=0.84. The short-run effects of
changes in the covariates are reﬂected in the coefﬁcients shown in
column (3). Multiplying the coefﬁcients by 1/(1−ρ̂)=6.25 leads to
estimates of the long-run effects of changes in each covariate.17 With
the exception of GATT and ACP, re-scaling the column (3) coefﬁcients
by 6.25 generates estimates quite similar to those in column (1). In
the case of ACP, controlling for slow-moving unobservables causes the
estimate to ﬂip signs relative to column (1).
Column (4) reports results based on within-dyad variation in trade.
Linkage variables that do not vary over time (distance, shared language,
shared legal origins, ColHist, and ColAlways) are captured by the dyadic
ﬁxed effects and drop out of the speciﬁcation. In comparison to the
column (1) pooled OLS estimates, the coefﬁcients fall but remain
statistically signiﬁcant. The GATT effect of 0.18 is close to the 0.15
estimate that Rose (2004)obtainswhenheemploys dyadicﬁxedeffects.
The RTA estimate of 0.45 is somewhat smaller than Baier and
Bergstrand's comparable estimate of 0.68.18 The effect of currency
unions, 0.42, is lower than the 0.65 found inGlick andRose (2002)using
the same method, but a somewhat smaller sample. As with the
coefﬁcient obtained in the LagDV speciﬁcation, using within-dyad
variation results in a negative estimated effect for ACP treatment.
In the ﬁnal two speciﬁcations, the tetrad method removes all (time-
varying) monadic effects (e.g., population, per capita income, and
multilateral resistance terms). We also employ dyadic ﬁxed effects.
Looking across the ﬁnal two columns, regressions that use France and
the UK as reference countries (column 5) or an average of 30 tetrad
combinations (column 6), we ﬁnd that the signs of the estimated
coefﬁcients on RTA, GATT, and currency union are the same as those
listed in column (4) but have lower magnitudes. The ACP coefﬁcient
reverses sign and becomes positive again. It appears that the perverse
negative effects found in the previous three speciﬁcations derive from
unobserved changes in the monadic effects of either the ACP or EU
members. After removing such effects, the tetrad regressions lead to
estimates of ACP effects that are similar in magnitude to the GATT and
currency union effects.
Fig. 4 displays our estimates of the 60 years-since-independence
dummy variables. The six panels correspond to the speciﬁcations in
Table 2. The squares represent exponentiated coefﬁcients of the
variables indicating 1, 2, 3,..., 60+ years since independence.19 The
empty square at 60 gives the average reduction in trade for 60 or more
years of independence. In the lagged dependent variable speciﬁcation,
independence effects are scaled (prior to exponentiating) by 1/(1− ρ̂)
so that they reﬂect long-run effects. We display a LOWESS smoothing
line through the estimates. The ﬁrst ﬁve panels shade the 95%
conﬁdence intervals for each estimate based on the standard error of
each coefﬁcient. The squares in the bottom-right panel represent
averages of coefﬁcients for 30 reference country combinations. The
shading in this panel corresponds to the region between the 10th and
90th percentiles. The reference group in all six panels is the trade during
the year of independence and the years prior to independence (given by
ColHist in the ﬁrst three columns, but normalized to zero in the
speciﬁcations with dyadic ﬁxed effects). For example, at 30 years of
independence, the OLS speciﬁcation graph (top left) tells us that trade
between former metropole and colony is about 50% of what it was
during the reference years (all else equal).
Non-parametric estimates of independence effects in the ﬁrst four
speciﬁcations, shown in the top four panels in Fig. 4, depict a common
time-proﬁle for colony–metropole trade. Trade tends to be slightly
higher relative to the base year in the ﬁrst ten years but this difference
is not statistically signiﬁcant. Subsequently, trade erodes steadily to
about 35% of pre-independence trade 40 years after independence
and then remains fairly steady. Since the LagDV speciﬁcation drops
initial observations for each dyad and the lagged dependent variable
captures much of the variation in exports, the standard errors of the
estimated independence effects are very large, as revealed by the
wide conﬁdence intervals in the middle-left panel.
The Poisson PMLE estimates (upper, right panel) differ from those
obtained in the other speciﬁcations in indicating sharp declines in
trade in the ﬁrst two years after independence. We ﬁnd that this
discrepancy mainly results from the incorrect zeros discussed in
Section 3.3. We re-estimate with a restricted sample where we try to
systematically eliminate incorrect zeros. Our primary criterion for
keeping observations corresponding to zero is that the value is
corroborated by reports from both the exporter and importer. This
ﬁlter eliminates most of the egregious incorrect zeros that occur
during the colonial period. For example, the zero trade observations
between France and Vietnam from 1948 to 1954 are dropped. We also
drop the suspect zero trade observations between former USSR
countries and all other countries in the years 1992 and 1993.20 For the
full sample, there are 592,923 positive trade ﬂows and 352,950 zeros.
With the reduced sample, the number of zeros falls to 288,456. The
estimated independence effects for the ﬁrst two years after indepen-
dence for the reduced sample are shownwith hollow diamonds in the
upper, right panel. They are substantially less negative than the
corresponding estimates based on the full sample and, in one case, not
17 A permanent one unit rise in D for a pair ij at time t increases contemporaneous
trade (xijt) by a direct effect of δ (in t as well as for all following years). There is also
the indirect effect through lagged trade. In t+1 for instance, the shock on Dijt further
raises xij,t+1 by δρ. In period T the total accumulated effect of the change in D is given
by δ(1+∑τ=1T ρτ ). As T→∞ the series converges to δ/(1−ρ).
18 Their estimate falls to 0.46 when monadic ﬁxed effects are introduced.
19 Exponentiating makes the results easier to interpret since the y-axis expresses an
estimate of the ratio of trade after x years of independence relative to the pre-
independence levels.
20 We kept zeros corresponding to Russian trade with countries other than those that
were members of the Soviet Union.
Table 1
Regression speciﬁcations used in Table 2 and Fig. 4.
Abbreviation Dep. Var. Monadic Vars. Dyadic-observed Dyadic-unobserved
(1) OLS ln xijt ln Ni, ln Nj, All Dijt None
ln yi, ln yj
(2) Poisson
PMLE
xijt ln Ni, ln Nj, All Dijt None
ln yi, ln yj
(3) LagDV ln xijt ln Ni, ln Nj, All Dijt ln xij,t−1
ln yi, ln yj
(4) DyadFE ln xijt ln Ni, ln Nj, Time-varying Dijt Fixed effects
ln yi, ln yj
(5) Tetrad ln rfiℓgfjkgt N/A Time-varying D̃ijt Fixed effects
Note: Dijt comprises log distance; ij indicators for sharing a border, a language, legal
origins, colonial history, ongoing colonial relationship; ijt indicators for regional trade
agreements, common currency, both i and j in GATT, i in ACP and j in EU, and Indep1 to
Indep60. All speciﬁcations include year dummies.
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statistically different from zero. The other independence effects do not
differ perceptibly across samples.
The tetrad speciﬁcations, shown in the bottom two panels, also
display substantial trade erosion. The average of the tetrad regressions
(bottom-right panel) portrays a 70% contraction in long-run trade
(after 40 years). One difference from the above panels is that tetrad
speciﬁcations estimate trade erosion to begin immediately after
independence. The tetrad method eliminates unobserved monadic
effects. It appears that in the ﬁrst decade following independence,
either former colonies or their metropoles had higher multilateral
trade propensities than before. We infer that in speciﬁcations (1)–(4)
these higher average trade propensities are reﬂected in positive
coefﬁcients for the initial set of independence dummies. However,
one should not make too much of these differences given the wide
conﬁdence intervals. The main ﬁnding that all six speciﬁcations agree
on is that post-independence trade does not exhibit immediate
signiﬁcant changes, but that after several decades, the accumulated
erosion is large and statistically signiﬁcant.
To measure colony–metropole trade after n years of independence
relative to trade between countries that never had a colonial
relationship, the coefﬁcient on the relevant independence variable
should be added to the coefﬁcient on ColHist. In the case of the OLS
estimates, the sum of ColHist and the coefﬁcient for being indepen-
dent 60 or more years is 1.995−1.722=0.273. Exponentiating and
subtracting one reveals that, on average, colony–metropole trade
remains 31% higher than trade of countries that were never in colonial
relationships. The LagDV results are remarkably similar: Adding the
60+ coefﬁcient to the colonial history effect (0.300−0.262=0.038),
scaling by 6.25, and exponentiating suggests that a 27% trade boost
persists after 60 years. Long-run effects of this magnitude would not
be surprising in light of the fact that we have not controlled for all
conceivable long-run legacies of the colonial relationship. For
example, overlap in ethnic populations is a long-run consequence of
colonization that is known to be positively associated with trade.21
It is not clear, however, that a colonial history remains a positive
inﬂuence on trade after 60 years. In the Poisson PMLE, the sum of the
corresponding estimates is negative, 1.317−1.740=−0.423, indi-
cating 34% less trade. We prefer the DyadFE and Tetrad speciﬁcations
to the ﬁrst three speciﬁcations because they control for unobserved
dyadic effects (and monadic effects in the Tetrad speciﬁcations) that
are correlated with independence. However, ColHist cannot be
estimated in these speciﬁcations because it does not vary over time.
Thus, while all the speciﬁcations show substantial trade erosion
subsequent to independence, the evidence is inconclusive on whether
trade between metropoles and former colonies remains permanently
21 See Rauch and Trindade (2002) for evidence.
Table 2
Gravity regression control variables.
Speciﬁcation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Poisson LagDV DyadFE Tetrad Tetrad
PMLE FRA, GBR 30 Avg.
Monadic variables
ln Pop, origin 0.882a 0.805a 0.142a 0.223a
(0.006) (0.025) (0.002) (0.045)
ln Pop, dest 0.767a 0.811a 0.124a 0.886a
(0.006) (0.025) (0.002) (0.039)
ln GDP/Pop, origin 1.030a 0.784a 0.162a 0.659a
(0.007) (0.029) (0.002) (0.015)
ln GDP/Pop, dest 0.868a 0.825a 0.138a 0.634a
(0.007) (0.027) (0.002) (0.014)
Time-ﬁxed dyadic variables
ln Dist (avg) −0.906a −0.641a −0.144a
(0.014) (0.040) (0.003)
Shared border 0.598a 0.548a 0.086a
(0.062) (0.110) (0.011)
Shared language 0.434a 0.524a 0.055a
(0.032) (0.111) (0.006)
Shared legal 0.306a 0.134 0.054a
(0.024) (0.087) (0.004)
ColHist 1.995a 1.317a 0.300a
(0.233) (0.141) (0.041)
ColAlways −0.960 −0.610 −0.173
(0.643) (0.418) (0.111)
Time-varying dyadic variables
RTA 0.868a −0.054 0.136a 0.435a 0.420a 0.383a
(0.038) (0.102) (0.007) (0.025) (0.028) (0.062)
Both GATT 0.120a 0.060 0.003 0.181a 0.102a 0.118c
(0.018) (0.059) (0.003) (0.015) (0.037) (0.082)
Shared currency 0.638a −0.008 0.091a 0.416a 0.125a 0.290c
(0.078) (0.086) (0.014) (0.065) (0.038) (0.156)
ACP 0.156a −0.199c −0.032a −0.402a 0.256a 0.097
(0.057) (0.115) (0.010) (0.051) (0.067) (0.186)
Lagged exports 0.840a
(0.001)
Observations 592,923 945,873 533,359 592,923 630,317 624,855.9
R2 .627 .743 .891 .843 n/a n/a
RMSE 1.888 1.903 0.974 1.225 1.465 1.481
Note: Standard errors in parentheses with a, b and c respectively denoting signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are robust to correlation of errors within dyads in
columns (1) to (4). Column (5) clusters by ij, it, and jt. Column (6) shows mean and standard deviation across 30 tetrad regressions.aMeans no negative coefﬁcients, bless than 5%
negative, and cless than 10% negative.
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higher than the level of trade for countries that were never in a
colonial relationship.
Three possible explanations for reductions in trade with the
metropole after independence are (1) reverse causation, (2) the
termination of trade arrangements imposed by the metropole, and (3)
thedeteriorationof trade-promoting capital suchas common institutions
and business networks. Reverse causation would arise if metropoles
relinquish control of colonies once they have exploited all of the trading
opportunities (e.g., extracted the natural resources). Under this story,
independence is the consequence, not the cause, of lower trade. In the
second story, the metropole has also colonized countries in order to
exploit its natural resources. Presumably, thiswould have distorted trade
patterns of the colony to be over-specialized in trading with the
metropole. Following independence, this abnormally high level of trade
with the former metropole would be abandoned by the newly
autonomous authorities of the colony. In cases (1) and (2) we would
therefore expect an immediate shift to a lower level of trade than what
prevailed prior to independence. Thereafter trade would be expected to
remain constant. Depreciation of trade-creating capital over a 40-year
period couldoccur as a result of thegradual retirementof businesspeople
who facilitated trade within the empire. Thus, the continuous trade
erosion depicted in Fig. 4 most closely conforms with explanation (3).
4.3. Falsiﬁcation exercise
Since the vast majority of independence cases involve a European
country, there is the concern that our results are driven by a tendency
for metropoles to reorient trade towards other European countries
and away from poor and remote countries (some of them being ex-
colonies, some not). Several factors might explain this general trend,
including the coincidence of European integration with decoloniza-
tion, and the growing importance of trade in manufactured goods (as
opposed to primary goods) over that period.
In order to address this concern, we conduct a falsiﬁcation exercise.
We ﬁrst identify a control group of countries that were never colonized
and have characteristics similar to the colonized group. It turns out that
this set of countries is a quite restricted one. It includes Bhutan, China,
Ethiopia, Iran, Liberia, Nepal, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Thailand.22
We assign the never-colonized countries randomly to potential
colonizers from Europe other than the UK and France, the two principal
European metropoles of the last century. We generate random
independence dates between 1950 and 1975. Table 3 shows the
resulting false history of decolonization.
We add a set of years-since-independence dummies for these false
independence events. Because the ﬁrst false independence date is
1962 and our sample ends in 2006, there are 44 independence
dummy variables. We focus on speciﬁcations (4) and (5), DyadFE and
Tetrads (using France and Britain as the reference countries), because
they remove unobserved dyadic effects that may be correlated with
the independence variables.
Fig. 5 portrays independence effects for the “false” colonial relation-
ships. The left panel shows dyadic FE estimates and reveals positive
independence effects,many ofwhich are signiﬁcant. Because the dyadic
FE estimates do not include monadic effects, the positive results we
observe might reﬂect increasing multilateral trading propensities
(beyond what is captured by the unreported year dummies) of
countries in the false colonial relationships. The tetrad method factors
out these monadic effects. The right panel displays the tetrad estimates
and we ﬁnd independence effects that are about equally divided
between positive and negative coefﬁcients and are never statistically
signiﬁcant. These results certainly do not suggest that the trade erosion
we ﬁnd for actual colonial relationships is driven by spurious dynamics.
4.4. Amicable versus hostile separations
The circumstances of the dissolution of colonial ties varied greatly.
For example, Algeria's war for independence from France involved a
protracted (1954–1962) and bloody conﬂict, whereas Senegal's 1960
independence occurred peacefully. We would expect hostile inde-
pendence events to cause more trade disruption than amicable ones.
Indeed, it seems possible that amicable separations do not depress
trade at all and that the results we have obtained so far are averages of
negative consequences of hostile separations and zero effects for
amicable ones. We test this proposition by categorizing independence
events as peaceful or hostile. Of the 220 independence events in our
data set, we categorized 154 as amicable and 66 as hostile.23 However,
limiting the sample to events that provide times series information in
our period of study, i.e. those occurring after 1900, we have 131
amicable and 43 hostile separations.
Fig. 6 presents estimated independence effects for each type of
separation. The left panel portrays results using theDyadFE speciﬁcation
whereas the right panel reﬂects the Tetrad speciﬁcation (again with
France and Britain as the reference countries). Since we now have two
lines per ﬁgure, we use shading (amicable) and brackets (hostile) to
identify the 95% conﬁdence intervals of the estimated trade reduction
ratios. Both panels indicate that trade eroded after independence for
hostile and amicable separations. However, hostile separations were
followed by abrupt collapses in trade. As before, the DyadFE speciﬁca-
tion yields positive effects in the early years after independence and the
tetrad method shows immediate trade declines. Throughout almost all
of the post-independence years, hostile separations are associated with
larger reductions in trade but the differences become smaller over time.
After about 55 years of separation the point estimates are quite similar
and the differences are not statistically signiﬁcant.
4.5. Trade with siblings and ROW
We observe that independence reduces colony trade with the
metropole. But what happens to colonial trade with other countries in
the colonial empire (siblings) aswell as rest-of-world (ROW)countries?
As is the case for trade with the metropole, trade between siblings may
decline suddenly due to termination of trade arrangements imposed on
members of the empire or gradually due to depreciation of colonial
capital. There are a couple of reasons to expect that trademight increase
with ROW countries. First, rising trading costs with the metropole and
siblings could redirect trade to other countries. Second, the metropole
might have constrained the ability of colonies to trade with ROW
countries prior to independence.24
22 Andorra, Norway, San Marino, and Switzerland were also never colonized, but are
clearly too dissimilar to be used in the control group.
Table 3
False colonial relationships and independence dates.
False colony False metropole False indep. date
Bhutan Belgium 1967
China Italy 1973
Ethiopia Spain 1962
Iran Spain 1962
Liberia Germany 1974
Nepal Austria 1964
Oman Switzerland 1970
Saudi Arabia Sweden 1971
Thailand Spain 1965
23 We started with information listed in the “Territorial Change” database (Tir et al.,
1998) from the Correlates of Wars project and used internet sources (the CIA Factbook,
BBC country briefs, and Wikipedia) to complete the classiﬁcation, shown in Table A4.
24 Bonfatti (2008) develops a Heckscher–Ohlin model of trade between a colony, a
metropole, and a third country which predicts that independence is more likely for
colonies with good trading opportunities with the rest of world. An implication of the
analysis is that independence should be accompanied by increased trade with the
third country (ROW).
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Tomeasure the impact of years of independence on trade with each
type of country, we estimate distinct independence effects for a colony's
trade with metropole, siblings, and ROW countries. For siblings, we
allow trade deterioration to occur as soon as one sibling gains
independence from its metropole and this deterioration is augmented
when the other sibling separates. To illustrate, consider Senegal's and
Algeria's separation from the French empire in 1960 and 1962,
respectively. For the observation corresponding to Senegal–Algeria
trade in 1964, the sibling dummy variable for four years since
independence turns on (Senegal has been independent for four years)
as does the sibling dummy variable for two years since independence
(Algeria has been independent for two years). A similar procedure is
applied to ROW trade. Consider the trade between Ghana and the Ivory
Coast in 1965. This is ROW trade because the two countries are neither
siblings nor colonies of one another. In 1965, Ghana had been
independent for nine years and the Ivory Coast for ﬁve years and we
code the two corresponding ROW dummy variables to turn on for that
observation. In the case of colony trade with a metropole other than its
ownor a never-colonized country, only one ROWdummyvariable turns
on (the one corresponding to years since independence of the colony).
The coding is complicated in cases where a country was colonized by
more than one metropole. A complete description of the coding
procedure is available at http://strategy.sauder.ubc.ca/head/sup/.
We cannot use the tetrad method to obtain separate effects for
metropole, sibling, and ROW. This is because the sum of these dummy
variables is collinear with the monadic effects. Thus, we conﬁne the
estimates to those generated in the DyadFE speciﬁcation and the
results are portrayed in Fig. 7. Adding the additional dummy variables
steepens and deepens the proﬁle of trade erosion with the metropole
that we observed in the comparable speciﬁcation of Fig. 4 (speciﬁ-
cation 4). For siblings we observe strong trade erosion as well. The
decline in sibling trade occurs immediately but levels off a bit sooner
than does metropole trade. The estimates for 60+ years post-
independence are nearly identical for metropole and siblings, at
Fig. 5. Estimated independence effects for false colonial relationships.
Fig. 6. Independence effects depend on type of separation.
Fig. 7. Trade with metropole, “siblings”, and rest-of-world after independence.
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about 27% of pre-independence trade. None of the differences
between the metropole and sibling effects throughout the years are
statistically signiﬁcant.
Interestingly, during the ﬁrst 30 years after independence, colony
trade with ROW declines by 20–30%. One potential explanation is that
many former colonies adopted import-substitution measures.25 After
four decades, ROW trade rebounds slightly but remains signiﬁcantly
lower than prior to independence. In unreported regressions we ﬁnd
that amicable separations lead to gradual reductions in trade with
ROW for 30–40 years before ﬂattening out. The slight increase in ROW
trade after 40 years seen in Fig. 7 is driven mainly by increasing,
positive ROW effects associated with hostile separations.26
We interpret the gradual trade erosion observed between siblings
as further evidence that the trade-enhancing “capital” (networks and
institutions) associated with empires encouraged inter-sibling trade
and that this capital depreciates after independence. Contrary to the
hypothesis that empires acted as constraints on pre-independence
trade diversiﬁcation of colonies, we ﬁnd that on average former
colonies did not redirect trade to ROW countries. Indeed, countries
that become independent on average trade less with all countries, with
the declinemost pronounced for tradewith the formermetropole and
former siblings.
4.6. Changes on the extensive margin
With the exception of the Poisson PMLE estimates, we have
examined effects of independence on exports conditional on ﬂows
being positive. These results can be interpreted as a decline in trade on
the intensive margin. As discussed in Section 3.3, problems with
incorrect zeros and choosing the left censor value make Tobit estimates
extremely sensitive to assumptions. Despite the problematic zeros, we
believe that it is instructive to see how independence affected the
extensivemargin of trade, i.e., the likelihoodof a former colony realizing
positive tradewith itsmetropole, siblings, andROWafter independence.
To estimate this probability, we code the positive tradeﬂows as one and
evaluate a binary dependent variable.
We estimate a linear probability model (LPM)where the dependent
variable equals one if exports are positive. The LPMhas the advantage of
directly estimating the marginal effects of years since independence on
the probability of positive trade.27 LPM can be estimated using the
within transformation to remove dyadic ﬁxed effects, which is not
possible in a probit model. Fixed effects logit estimation can accommo-
date dyadic ﬁxed effects but it discards dyads where observations are
either all positive or all zero. This could cause selection bias. Suppose
colony–metropole tradeﬂowsare continuouslypositive before andafter
independence. Thiswould suggest that independencehad little effect on
the extensivemargin for this dyad. LPM takes this into account butﬁxed
effects logit ignores this information.
We estimate with the full sample aswell as with a restricted sample
that eliminates incorrect zeros using the criteria described inSection4.2.
The estimates are graphed in Fig. 8. The left panel shows results for the
full sample. We observe an initial increase in the probability of positive
trade with the metropole, siblings, and ROW of about 10 percentage
points. Because we are estimating with dyadic ﬁxed effects, this
probability is relative to the likelihood of positive trade ﬂows in the
colonial period. The increased probability of positive ﬂows stays fairly
steady for siblings and ROW but decreases steadily for metropole,
becoming negative after about 20 years and continuing to decline
thereafter. Estimates for the reduced sample, shown in the right panel,
display metropole and sibling effects that are shifted downward. Now
the independence effect for tradewithmetropole is always negative and
the sibling effect becomes negative late in the sample. The reason for the
shift is that our screening method disproportionately drops reported
(and presumably false) zero trade ﬂows for the pre-independence
period. With fewer zeros initially, the relative likelihood of positive
trade ﬂows will fall.
These estimated independence effects on the extensive margin of
trade should be interpreted with caution. As we discuss in detail in
Appendix A, there are many reasons to distrust the many zero ﬂows
reported in DOTS. Unless the zeros are valid, the estimates are
25 See Bruton (1998) for a survey and reconsideration of these policies.
26 The estimated effects of independence on ROW trade for hostile separations are
positive during the ﬁrst 20 years of independence, negative for the next 15 years, and
thereafter are positive. They are mostly insigniﬁcantly different from zero due to large
standard errors. Figures showing independence effects on metropole, sibling, and
ROW trade for amicable and hostile separations are available at http://strategy.sauder.
ubc.ca/head/sup/.
27 See Angrist and Pischke (2009, pp. 102–107, 197) for a full exposition of the
arguments for using LPM instead of probit or logit.
Fig. 8. Linear probability model estimates of independence effects on the extensive margin.
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unreliable. Nonetheless, these results suggest that tradewithmetropole
eroded on both the intensive and extensive margin. However, trade
with siblings and ROW, while decreasing on the intensive margin,
exhibits small increases on the extensive margin. One explanation is
that the metropole dictated trade with certain siblings and ROW
countries but not others. Once free from colonial rule, colonies became
began to trade with new countries, while, at the same time, reducing
trade with traditional trading partners.
5. Conclusion
Weﬁnd that independence erodes colonial tradewith themetropole
and other countries in the colonial empire. On average, trade between a
colony and itsmetropole declines by about 65% during theﬁrst 40 years
of independence. Trade between siblings falls by a similar amount.
Hostile separations lead tomore immediate negative reductions in trade
than amicable separations but long-run trade deterioration is similar for
both. Trade erosion is not conﬁned to the colonial empire—we also ﬁnd
that trade with third countries falls after independence by about 20%.
Our analysis of the extensive margin reveals large decreases in the
likelihood of positive trade ﬂows with the metropole and small
increases in the propensity to trade with siblings and third countries.
In addition to controlling for a large number of covariates commonly
used in gravity equations, our preferred speciﬁcations account for
unobserved country and country-pair inﬂuences. The tetradmethodwe
develop removes time-varying importer and exporter effects anddyadic
effects to account for time-invariant bilateral inﬂuences. Our falsiﬁca-
tion exercise supports the hypothesis that declines in trade between
colonizers and metropoles were caused by independence, rather than
historical trends that happened to coincide with independence.
Non-parametric estimates portray a steady erosion of trade for four
decades after independence. This time-proﬁle is not what one would
expect if former colonies used their independence to immediately
terminate patterns of trade that had been imposed by the colonial
power. It also does not support a reverse causation story whereby
metropoles free colonies once colonial resources have been fully
exploited. The most plausible interpretation of the pattern of trade
reduction observed in the data is that it arises from the depreciation of
trade-promoting capital embodied in institutions and networks of
individuals with knowledge of trading opportunities.
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Appendix A. Data
A.1. Compiling trade ﬂows from DOTS
The DOTS database often reports two values for the same ﬂow
from country A to B. This is because country A may report its imports
from B and country B reports its exports to A. While some researchers
simply take the average of those two values, it seems preferable to try
and infer what is the most reliable source of data and drop
information from the other source. Given the problematic zeros
reported in the database (discussed in detail below), we consider as
most reliable the larger value reported by the two countries. When
using exporter reported trade, we adjust for the fact that exports are
reported FOB while imports are reported CIF, with a 10% difference in
value, which is the actual mean margin revealed by countries
reporting imports in both CIF and FOB values.
In the compiled data set, 1% of the trade observations are valued at
less than $500 and there are 42 cases of trade of one cent. The IMF
documentation states that trade is recorded in millions with accuracy
out to one or two decimal places, depending on the reporting country.
Two decimal places would make the smallest value of trade $10,000.
Accordingly, we round the data to the nearest $10,000—trade below
$5000 becomes zero.
Scrutiny of the reported zeros in DOTs reveals many cases were
reported zero trade are actually cases where the true trade value is
likely positive. Evidence of incorrect zeros include:
• Trade between France and Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia is recorded
as zero between 1948 and 1953 or 1954 and then becomes positive
thereafter. French exports to Vietnam jump from 0 to $132.9 million
from 1954 to 1955 (1954 is the year of independence). United
Nations (1955) reports that French exports to and imports from
Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) for the January to
September period were $200.2 million and $21.7 million in 1953
and $164.4 million and $16.0 million in 1954.
• DOTS records zero trade between Russia and Ukraine, Kazakhstan,
and Uzbekistan in 1992/3 and positive ﬂows thereafter. Russian
exports to the Ukraine jump from 0 to $5997.8 million from 1993 to
1994. The independence date is 1991 for this empire.
• We predicted trade using the OLS estimates corresponding to
speciﬁcation (1) in Table 2 and examined predicted trade for cases
where actual trade was recorded as zero. 13% of the zeros were
predicted to have trade in excess of $1 million. While some of these
cases corresponded to special circumstances (the war between Iran
and Iraq may have eliminated trade between them28), other cases,
such as Iran's zero exports to Russia from 1981 to 1987 (exports for
this dyad were missing from 1969 to 1980 and jumped to
$106 million in 1988) suggest incorrect data.
• There are over 1200 cases where an exporting country or an
importing country records all zero trade ﬂows with every trading
partner in a given year. These “no imports” or “no exports”
represent over 70,000 observations in the data set. In about half of
the no-trade cases, DOTS records zero trade with at least 70 trading
partners.
• Gleditsch (2002) closely investigates DOTS data and states “On
closer inspection, many of the trade ﬂows of exactly zero in the DOT
data seem problematic. To maintain a rectangular data structure,
many missing observations appear to have been substituted with
zeros. These structural zeros are probably better treated as missing
observations rather than true zeros.”
Falsely reporting missings as zeros biases analysis that utilizes
information on zeros. In the case of French trade with Indochina,
independence would correspond to a huge amount of trade creation.
In the case of Russian trade with former Soviet block countries, trade
would increase dramatically a few years after independence.
Moreover, the incorrect zeros for trade within empires introduce
positive bias in regressions estimating the effect of independence on
the probability of realizing non-zero trade.
A.2. Gravity controls
GDPs and populations come from the World Bank's World
Development Indicators (WDI). Note that in accordance to trade
ﬂows, GDPs are not deﬂated. Since the WDI excludes Taiwan, we use
national data sources.WDI also starts in 1960 and sometimes does not
keep track of countries that ceased to exist, or changed deﬁnitions.
28 See Martin et al. (2008) for a quantiﬁcation of the trade disrupting effects of
military conﬂicts.
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Typically, WDI has Russian GDP starting in 1989. In order to correct
both problems, we complement WDI with population estimates
provided by Angus Maddison (http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/
Historical_Statistics/horizontal-ﬁle_10-2006.xls). Furthermore, we
also use the 1948–1992 GDP estimates collected by Katherine Barbieri
and made available by the Correlates of Warproject (http://www.
correlatesofwar.org/).
RTAs are mainly constructed from three main sources: Table 3
of Baier and Bergstrand (2007) supplemented with the WTO web
site (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/summary_e.
xls) and qualitative information contained in Frankel (1997).
GATT/WTO membership of different countries over time comes
from the WTO website. The data on currency unions are an
updated and extended version of the list provided by Glick and
Rose (2002). Data on common legal origins of the two countries
are vailable from Andrei Shleifer at http://post.economics.harvard.
edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/qgov_web.xls. Bilateral distances and
common (ofﬁcial) language come from the CEPII distance database
(http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm). We use the
population-weighted great circle distance between large cities of the
two countries.
The ACP variable refers to a sequence of agreements conferring
preferential treatment of imports from former colonies and some
other developing countries (e.g. Liberia). Our ACP dummy is coded as
one when an ACP country is included in the agreement and it exports
to a member of the EC/EU. Both the ACP and EC/EU memberships
grow over time, as shown below (obtained from http://ec.europa.eu/
development/geographical/cotonou/lomegen/lomeevolution_en.
cfm):
• Yaoundé I (1963): Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Côte
d'Ivoire, Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda,
Senegal, Somalia, Togo
• Yaoundé II (1969): Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda
• Lomé I (1975): The Bahamas, Barbados, Botswana, Ethiopia, Fiji,
Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Jamaica,
Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Samoa, Sierra Leone,
Sudan, Swaziland, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Zambia
• Lomé II (1979): Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Dominica, Kiribati,
Papua New Guinea, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles,
Solomon Islands, Suriname, Tuvalu
• Lomé III (1984): Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Dominican
Republic, Mozambique, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Vanuatu, Zimbabwe
• Lomé IV (1990): Equatorial Guinea, Haiti
• Lomé IV revised (1995): Eritrea, Namibia, South Africa
• Cotonou (2000): Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, Federated States of
Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau
The chronology of EC/EU membership:
• EC6 (1957): Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, The
Netherlands
• EC9 (1973): Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom
• EC10 (1981): Greece
• EC12 (1986): Portugal, Spain
• EU15 (1995): Austria, Finland, Sweden
• EU25 (2004): Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia
A.3. Independence events
Table A.4 lists the independence dates for each empire, denoting
hostile separations with a †.
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